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Abstract
The transfer of very large files often faces the problem of performance degradation due
to bottlenecks or congestions in a network. Large file transfer is typical in Grid 
networks [11], where multiple nodes cooperate and run a common application. To
improve the performance of large file transfer and to reduce the transfer time, this paper
proposes a new file transfer application, called Secure Large File Transfer (SLFT) that 
supports file transfer over multiple independent network paths. For this purpose, SLFT
uses Grid nodes as relays in order to route traffic to the destination. The described
problem may also be solved on a lower layer of the OSI model; however, given the high 
heterogeneity of Grid environments, implementing the required mechanisms on layer 2 
or 3 might not be feasible due to the inherent differences between the i
volved ISP 
domains. Taking the approach to the application layer, makes possible to create a
generic mechanism able to operate over the different possible underlying 
communication infrastructure [12]. 
The SLFT application has been implemented as a part of the GINTONIC toolbox, a set 
of Grid-specific network enhancements developed under the EC-GIN project [5]. In 
Grid networks nodes are geographically distributed, several administrative domains
may be involved, and the communication is in a potentially hostile environment, the
transfer of files involves several security threats which are addressed by the security
architecture design of the SLFT application. This paper presents the design and 
implementation details of the SLFT application, focusing on the necessary security
features. Based on practical experiences and evaluation in a test-bed, the performance of 
the SLFT application has been assessed. Evaluation results show that SLFT can 




¾Limited file transfer performance
¾Due to bottlenecks, bandwidth limitations etc.
¾ IP routing uses a single path
• Goal
¾ Improve the file transfer
performance
 By using several disjoint paths
 By using Grid nodes as relays
The bandwidth between two nodes existing in the Internet is usually limited and 
therefore, the file transfer performance is also limited. Although several disjoint paths 
between nodes are likely to exist due to multi-homing or peering agreements, IP routing 
uses only a single path between two given nodes. According to IP routing and current 
routing protocols, all packets sent from the source node to the destination follow the
same path, which would be the shortest in routing terminology. The use of other paths 
would only take place if the availability of the shortest path becomes affected. 
The goal of the SLFT application is to improve the performance of the file transfer by
using several disjoint network paths and by using Grid nodes as relays. Transmitting
data over various network paths makes possible the collaboration of different Grid 
operators in order to make a file transfer more efficient. The usage of parallel paths for 
the transmissions is sometimes implemented inside some operators’ network, but never
on a larger scale in multi domain environments. Making use of alternative paths in
parallel to perform data transfer between two nodes belonging to different domains is 
the objective of the presented SLFT application. The obvious idea behind this procedure 
is that if the information is partitioned in smaller chunks and sent in parallel through the
disjoint paths, the overall bandwidth will be larger and congestion of each path will 
decrease and this way the efficiency of the transfer will grow.
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Security Requirements
• Authentication
¾ Identify users and relays of the Grid.
• Authorization
¾Grant or deny permissions to perform certain actions
based on the identity.
• Delegation
¾Grant entities with a subset of other entities rights.
• Data Protection
¾Confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of 
transferred data.
In order to implement a file transfer application in a real environment, several security 
aspects need to be taken into account. An important fact to think about is the nature of 
the environment in which the application is intended to work, which is a Grid 
environment. This point is of great influence in the way that the requirements need to be 
addressed.
The identified security requirements and how they are fulfilled by the SLFT application 
are summarized in the following list: 
• Authentication is a basic requirement in the large file transfer scenario. A mean of 
identifying the users and hosts accessing the service has to be provided. In the 
present case, a PKI infrastructure using X.509 certificates and a trusted third party 
acting as a certificate authority has been implemented to solve these needs. This 
infrastructure will also be required by the data protection features.
• Authorization resolves to grant or deny access to resources based on user identity 
and membership of groups or virtual organizations. This feature has been 
implemented using X.509 certificates to control the identity of the respective user 
and check it against the data contained in a file containing the correspondent 
information. This concept is known as Grid map from the Globus Toolkit [7]. 
• Delegation is the ability of an entity to grant another one with a subset of its rights.
This requires some kind of information to be exchanged between delegator and 
delegation receiver. X.509 proxy certificates have been selected for this purpose.
Another important fact is to decide where this information is stored. MyProxy
credential repository [15] of the Globus Toolkit has been used for this purpose. 
• Data protection covers several aspects related to the protection of the transferred 
data. Requirements include integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation fall. To 
implement this feature, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [4], a standard protocol 
to secure data at transport level, has been selected.



















The component in charge of the file transmission is one amongst the several ones 
belonging to the GINTONIC architecture developed by the EC-GIN project [5]. The 
above figure shows only the GINTONIC components involved in the SLFT process. 
The proposed architecture is a distributed system consisting of several autonomous
components that work as independent daemons on the system. Some of the components
are responsible for the data transfer, while some have management and service location 
functionality.
The Base Implementation (BI) is a central component of the GINTONIC architecture 
and the SLFT application. It is responsible for the management and enables the different 
components to communicate and work as a whole system. It also contains the Service 
Discovery (SD) component that is used to locate services in other nodes and interact 
with them. In the SLFT application the SD component is used to find possible relay 
nodes for the data transfer. Applications built on top of the architecture access different
services over the BI. In case of SLFT, the BI includes the API for accessing the SLFT 
service.
The Peer Awareness (PA) component is used for the detection of shared bottlenecks 
[13][14]. It performs one-way delay measurements based on active probes to detect 
paths sharing a common link. The PA is used jointly with the SD component to 
determine the list of disjoint paths between the sender and receiver nodes. In addition, 
the PA component is capable of measuring the congestion of a link, making possible to 
detect overloading situations and providing information for rebalancing data flows. 
The SLFT component provides the data transfer functionality by creating fixed-size 
chunks from a file and relaying them to the next hop SLFT component. The SLFT can 
request external GINTONIC components to perform balancing calculations in order to 
establish the amount of data to send through each connection, otherwise, the default 
behaviour to balance data amongst available connections is using a round-robin fashion. 
On the destination node, the SLFT component joins the chunks and creates a single file 
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from them. The maximum number of different paths to be used by the SLFT can be 
configured.
The Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) component provides features 
related to user authentication, service access authorization, and accounting for service 
usage by measuring time, number of bytes and packets. It contains the credential 
repository and features related to the credential management including interactions with 
the Trusted Third Party/Certification Authority (TTP/CA). The SLFT component 
contacts the AAA to authenticate the user, to authorize the file transfer service, and to 
retrieve delegated credentials. 
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Certification in the security architecture follows a Public Key Infrastructure concept. 
Each infrastructure component has a certificate that is used in the agen	 authentication 
as well as in the establishment of secure communication channels. These certificates are 
issued by the Trusted Third Party/Certification Authority (TTP/CA). In the architecture
a hierarchical certification concept is followed. The TTP/CA issues domain certificates
by signing each domain’s certificate. Domain certificates in turn are used to issue and
sign the certificates of infrastructure components in the respective domain (e.g., AAA 
Servers, SLFT Agents), and certificates of authorized Users. The ‘Domain’ layer can be
extended with additional layers of certificates, depending on the administrative needs of 
the respective domain (e.g., to have a hierarchical certification in a domain).
Certificates follow the X.509 certificate format. In order to reduce the impact of 
compromised keys, all certificates feature an expiry date, and lists of revoked 
keys/certificates are maintained in the respective domain. Domain certificates and their
revocation list are stored on the TTP/CA’s certificate server in order to allow for their 
secure revocation. While time constraints on real-time service session establishments
may force components to cache communication partner certificates, it is desirable to
verify both certificate and revocation list with the responsible certificate server 
whenever possible and economically viable. The domain certificates are k
own to all
infrastructure elements either by event-driven download from the respective certificate
servers, or by caching, possibly effectuated by regular background processes. Validity
of the domain certificates is regularly checked with the TTP/CA in order to be able to
react to key revocations.
The security architecture also allows credential delegation based on standard proxy 
credentials [8]. Users can request temporary proxy credentials from the AAA server. 
Proxy credentials have a short lifetime and are signed by the credentials of the user. By 
using proxy credentials, users can delegate their credentials to agents without disclosing 
their private keys and agents can act on behalf of the user. Agents can delegate these
proxy credentials further to other agents. 
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SLFT Process – Registration
SLFT Agent BI(+SD)
TLS channel establishment





Fig 1: Agent registration
In Figure 1, the registration phase is depicted. This occurs only once, when the SLFT 
agent starts. The purpose of the registration is that the SLFT agent advertises its 
availability as a relay node and the Service Discovery registers the agent in the service 
repository. After registration, other SLFT agents can find the new agent using the
service discovery functionality. 
During the registration, the SLFT agent establishes a secure channel with the BI 
component using TLS. The SLFT agent uses its certificate to establish this channel. 
Mutual authentication happens based on the certificates of the SLFT and BI
components. The Service Discovery component authorizes the connection establishment
based on its local authorization policy using the identity stated in the certificate. If the 
SLFT agent is authorized, it issues a Register request over the secure TLS channel. The 
request follows a service specific protocol according to the SLFT implementation.
Finally, the Service Discovery registers the SLFT Agent in the service repository and
acknowledges the Register request. A DHT is used to store the information related to 
each agent. The stored parameters are a service identifier and the IP address and name
of the specific agent. Since the SLFT service is just one of the several services available
in GINTONIC, the service identifier is used to determine its nature.  It is used as
primary key in the DHT to establish a mapping between service and IP address when 
looking for relays with a specific service. The target name is required in the logic of the 
delegation process. 
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SLFT Process – Data Transfer

















Fig 2: Data transmission
In Figure 2 the data transfer phase is shown, where the user requesting the service is 
authenticated and authorized and a secure communication channel is established for
data transfer between SLFT Agents. The figure shows only two SLFT Agents for
simplicity, but the connection setup to other SLFT Agents along the path is analogous to 
the steps described. It is assumed that the SLFT Agents are running and they performed 
the registration with the Service Discovery as discussed above. 
• The application which needs to start the secure file transfer uses the SLFT API to 
request a transfer over the BI. 
• The BI transmits the request to the local SLFT Agent. 
• Before the SLFT Agent starts an SLFT transmission, it authenticates and authorizes 
the user and retrieves the proxy credential of the user from the AAA (MyProxy) 
server. Therefore, the user types his username and password and the SLFT Agent
requests authentication from the AAA (MyProxy) server.
• The AAA (MyProxy) server authenticates the user based on the username and
password and authorizes the access to the credential repository. If the user is
successfully authenticated and he is authorized, the AAA (MyProxy) server sends 
back the proxy credential to the SLFT Agent. 
• The SLFT Agent stores the proxy credential locally if the authentication was
successful. If the authentication failed, the SLFT Agent refuses the SLFT 
transmission. Additionally, the SLFT Agent checks authorization based on the local
policies of the node (GridMap). If the user is not authorized, the SLFT Agent 
refuses the SLFT transmission.
• To determine the network paths to be used, the SLFT Agent contacts the BI. The SD 
gets all the available SLFT agents and it uses the Peer Awareness component to 
detect shared bottlenecks amongst them. The result is a set of disjoint paths which is 
returned to the requester.
• The SLFT Agent establishes a secure TLS connection to the next SLFT Agent along 
the data path. The SLFT Agent uses the proxy credential of the user to connect to 
the next SLFT Agent. 
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• SLFT Agent 2 performs authentication based on the proxy certificate and checks 
authorization based on local policies (GridMap). If the user is not authorized, SLFT 
Agent 2 refuses the SLFT transmission. 
• After the TLS channel is established between SLFT Agent 1 and 2, SLFT Agent 1 
starts the data transfer over the TLS connection. 
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Testbed
• Nodes
¾ Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU 3.06GHz with 256KB cache
¾ Linux operating system
¾ Kernel version 2.6.28.1
¾ Java Runtime Environment 1.6.0_10
• Network
¾ 100 Mbit/s links between hosts and routers
¾ 10 Mbit/s links between routers
In order to perform all performance evaluation experiments of the SLFT application, a 
testbed has been set up. The testbed is depicted in the figure. Three nodes act as routers 
and four nodes as Grid nodes running the SLFT application. The machines are standard 
PCs with Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU 3.06GHz with 256KB caches and runni
g Linux 
operating system. The SLFT application is running in a Java Runtime Environment
1.6.0_10. The network links between the nodes are 100Mbit/s Ethernet con
ections. In 
order to have multiple paths in the testbed that do not share a common bottleneck, the 
bandwidth of some links have to be reduced. For this purpose the bandwidth has been 
limited to 10Mbit/s for the connections between routers and left unchanged for the 
connections between hosts and routers. 





Scenario 1: Direct transmission Scenario 2: Transmission using one relay
• Experiment settings
¾ Different file sizes: 102, 424 and 732 MB
¾ Two transfer scenarios with and without relay node
For the evaluation of the SLFT application two different scenarios have been taken. In 
the first scenario the SLFT application is used without relay nodes. Thus, there is no 
parallel transfer and the file is transferred over a direct path between source (Host A)
and destination (Host D). In the second scenario the SLFT application used an 
additional relay node (Host B) for the file transfer besides the direct path between 
source (Host A) and destination (Host D). Furthermore, three different file sizes have
been used in both scenarios in order to measure the performance of the SLFT
application. The selected file sizes are 102MB file, a 424MB file and a 732MB. The
experiments for each setting have been repeated 10 times.
The results of the experiments are shown in the tables above. As expected, the file 
transfer time increases linearly with the file size in both scenarios. However, as it can be
noticed, the SLFT application achieves a 50% reduction of the transfer time, when using
parallel paths in the second scenario. This is because both paths have an end-to-end
capacity of 10 Mbit/s, resulting in a total capacity of 20 Mbit/s between source and 
destination, and the SLFT application sends data on each path in parallel, which halves
the transfer time compared to the direct data transfer with 10 Mbit/s. The SLFT 
application achieves a data transfer rate of around 9.5 Mbit/s in the first scenario and 
19.1 Mbit/s in the second scenario. Thus, it can utilize the complete path capacity fairly 
good.
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Performance Analysis (2/3)
• CPU overhead
¾ Slight increase in secure mode (~10%).
Fig 2: Secure transmissionFig 1: Non-secure transmission
• Comparison: SLFT, SCP, FTP
In order to determine the performance of the SLFT application compared to other file
transfer applications, study cases with FTP [17] and SCP [18] have been performed as
well. In the case of direct transmission, the performance of the SLFT application is 
slightly worse than in the other cases. In the case of the relayed transmission, the 
consumed time is halved in relation to the non-relayed SLFT and almost halved with 
respect to SCP and FTP. No significant change in the consumed time for transferring
with SCP or FTP has been noticed. 
The process of private key encryption is costly. The encryption/decryption processes at 
sender/receiver and the handshake processes required to establish a secure data 
transmission on each relay introduce additional overhead in the data transfer. One of the 
key factors to take into account for measuring cost related to the secure data transfer is 
CPU overhead. Therefore, the CPU load has been measured for data transfers with and 
without encryption. Since the TLS channel is established from point to point, the
experiments have been performed over a pair of single nodes: sender and receiver. In
order to measure the influence of the TLS transmissions over the file size, the same file
sizes studied in the former case have been used. 
Analyzing the whole process; in the case of the secure transfer, the average CPU usage 
is 36%. The non-secure transfer achieves an average CPU usage of 33%. Performance
measurements have been taken as well from the receiver side. The values achieved in 
the CPU overhead are not significantly different, so apparently the process of 
decryption has a similar cost to the encryption case. As it can be seen, the secure
transfer results in a slightly increased CPU overhead compared to the non-secure 
transfer.
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Performance Analysis (3/3)
• Authentication performance
¾Request and download credential from an AAA
server
¾Average time of 755 ms
• Authorization performance
¾Small overhead depending on the size of the
authorization file
• Delegation performance
¾No relevant performance degradation compared to
the non-delegation case
Another aspect to take into account regarding performance is the influence of 
authentication, authorization, and delegation features in the SLFT use case. Each of 
these processes has to be performed for each transmission, thus it is important to 
quantify the performance degradation. 
In the case of authentication, several measurements have been carried out in order to 
determine the necessary time for logging in to the server and download the proxy
credential. An average of 755 ms has been measured when requesting authentication 
from the AAA server in the same domain. Since this process is not highly time
consuming and is expected to happen just once, the caused overhead is negligible. 
In case of authorization, the overhead depends mainly on the size of the authorization
file. When a node receives an incoming connection, it compares the identity of the 
initiator with all the information in the authorization file, which has been previously
stored in a Java data structure. The code will sequentially check this structure in order to 
find the stated identity. For average cases the operation will not produce relevant
overhead.
The overhead of delegating proxy credentials when establishing connections has been 
measured as well. The transmission time measurement results when enabling delegation
show no relevant difference with the non-delegation case. This is justified by the small
additional size in the transmission caused by including the proxy certificate. 
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Conclusions
• The SLFT application offers a way to transfer data
efficiently and securely in hostile environments
with limited bandwidth.
• The SLFT application can improve the speed of 
data transfer
¾Transfer time reduced by 50% using two parallel
disjoint paths
¾To determine the general performance improvement
of SLFT further measurements in more complex
scenarios are required
• Security features introduce efficiency loss that is
hardly avoidable.
The developed SLFT application provides efficient data transfer for large files over
multiple parallel network paths. SLFT integrates security mechanisms and fulfills the
identified security requirements, allowing its deployment in real environments with 
security threats. The SLFT application has been implemented and evaluated based on 
experiments in a testbed. According to the evaluation results, the approach of 
partitioning large files in smaller chunks and transmitting them in parallel over several 
disjoint paths improves the file transfer performance. Measurements in a more complex
environment are required in order to establish a fixed performance gain. Evaluation 
results have shown that the overhead caused by the security features is low and it is 
justified by the trade-off with the security requirements.
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